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Introduction
Man, though himself a child of nature, is — in Herder’s words — a freed man of nature.
Through reason he is able to disentangle himself from natural compulsions and adapt
nature to his needs. Admittedly, that also means his relation to nature is not thoroughly
determined by nature but rather is precariously open. Reason is thus continuously
required to clarify and justify anew man’s relation to nature. In other words, it is
constitutive ofman that he has a concept of nature and hence also a fundamental need
for a philosophy of nature. It is no accident that in the Ionian world the philosophy
of nature was “the form in which philosophy as such was born” (Wahsner ZOOZ: 9).
In this respect, it is surprising that the present age, which more than any previous era
is determined by the results and applications of scientific research, has not developed
a thoroughgoing philosophy of nature. Instead, it is the philosophy of science, or philo-
sophical reflection on the foundations of natural science, which — prepared already in
the second half of the nineteenth century — has attained a truly epochal status during
the twentieth century and continues to dominate contemporary philosophy. As the
latter has allowed the philosophy ofscience to supersede the philosophy ofnature, it has
neglected to develop a concept of nature adequate for our time. Yet the sheer number
of popular publications on cosmogony, elementary particle physics, chaos theory, etc.,
up to theories of biogenesis, evolution, ecology, neurophysiology, and brain science
(even including freedom of the will) are all indicative of an immense epistemic need.
But popular scientific commentary, however interesting and commendable, does not
amount to a philosophy nature. It reports and explains the results of scientific research,
but it is not a philosophical reflection on the “principle nature.”
In this situation, it is only natural that our gaze turns back so as to inquire of the
philosophical tradition and to clarify the extent to which the enormous intellectual
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achievements of the past might still be of use. The present investigation brings into 
view the philosophy of nature of German Idealism, a philosophical movement which 
emerged around the beginning of the nineteenth century. German Idealism appro- 
priated certain motivations of the Kantian philosophy and developed them further in 
a "speculative" manner (Engelhardt 1972, 1976, 2002). This powerful philosophical 
movement, associated above all with the names of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel - and 
moreover having nothing whatsoever to do with the "subjective idealism" of George 
Berkeley - was replaced by philosophical positions designated roughly as metaphysics 
of the will, Marxism, life-philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism, as well 
as positivism, empiricism, philosophy of science, the linguistic turn, and analytic 
philosophy. These philosophical positions more or less still shape us today. German 
Idealism amounts to a virtual intellectual-historical antithesis to these movements 
and thus presents itself in retrospect as a striking alternative. 
The basis of Idealism - in its various respective forms - is the ideal <Ideelle>, and thus 
the opposite of that which is real. It continually takes as its task explaining the real in 
terms of the ideal, and this is especially true of the Idealists' philosophy of nature.' Is 
this a hopeless undertaking? Does Idealism not lack an empirical basis? Can one secure 
any solid ground whatsoever in the ether of the ideal? In what follows, I explain how, 
more than anyone else, Schelling and Hegel sought to handle this problem and to cope 
with it. By way of anticipation, a clear preference for the Hegelian philosophy of nature 
will emerge in what follows, a preference which may come as some surprise considering 
how much controversy has surrounded the significance of that view. The project of 
renewing a thoroughgoing philosophy of nature can meaningfully begin here. 
My presentation begins with Kant's philosophical project, which played a key role 
in understanding German Idealism, and then considers in detail the philosophical 
approaches developed by Schelling and Hegel. Without doubt, the true initiator 
of German Idealism is Fichte. However, following Kant, Fichte's primary interest 
concerns exclusively the Transcendental Philosophy. Although within that framework 
one finds various remarks about nature, Fichte did not develop his own philosophy of 
nature. For this reason, his work is only mentioned here in passing. Commensurate 
with his significance, however, are four articles in the present volume which discuss 
Fichte's philosophy in detail. 
Numerous other thinkers are to be included among the German Idealists - the 
more or less central being Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), Karl Leonhard 
Reinhold (1758-1823), Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Friedrich Hdlderlin 
(1770-1843), Novalis (1772-1801) and Friedrich Schlegel(1772-1829). However, in 
the present context it seems appropriate to restrict the scope of investigation to the 
Kant 
As stated earlier, one cannot conceive of German Idealism independently of Kant's 
philosophy, and so it is at a minimum necessary to outline the main features of the 
latter. Here, emphasis is naturally placed on those of Kant's arguments which are 
65 
GERMAN IDEALISM 
the most relevant for the philosophy of nature. I begin with the groundwork for the 
theoretical philosophy as it was developed in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), 
followed by a few brief remarks on Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
(1786). Then, and of particular importance, is the Critique ofJudgment (1790), a work 
which contains essential insights of enduring significance regarding the essence of life 
and which was itself extremely important for the development of German Idealism. 
Finally, I consider Kant's Opus Postumum. Though this work was first published in 
1936 and thus could not have had any direct influence on German Idealism, it is 
nevertheless investigated here with respect to the far-reaching philosophical motives 
contained therein. It is interesting that Kant's thought, as is shown, has in the end 
already moved in the direction of Idealism. 
Critique of Pure Reason 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant asserts - in opposition to Hume's empiricism 
- that the lawfulness of nature can be explained thoroughly, though not by means 
of experience alone. Experience "certainly tells us what is there, but it does not 
tell us what must necessarily be one way and not another" (KVR: A l ) .  In order 
to explain the possibility of natural laws, Kant performs a revolutionary reinterpre- 
tation, a "Copernican Turn," as it were. Accordingly, knowledge need not simply 
conform to nature; on the contrary, nature must itself, in a certain sense, conform 
to knowledge. The object of knowledge is understood not as something already fully 
determined and available for empirical assimilation; rather, it is only by means of 
the subject that it is first determined what the object is. Kant is certainly of the 
opinion, which he carefully outlines, that the subject is "affected" by an external 
"thing in itself." However, the still chaotic sense-data which the subject receives in 
this way are, according to Kant, given order and form by the subject. First, they are 
ordered through the forms of intuition, namely space and time, which already lie in 
the subject and confer on the sense-data the character of spatial-temporal intuitions. 
The sense-data are clasped in the unity of self-consciousness to the "synthetic unity of 
apperception" (KVR: B131-9) and then determined further by means of the categories 
of the understanding which similarly already lie within the subject - categories such 
as "quantity," "causality," and "substance." In this way, the spatial-temporal ordering 
of intuitions is imprinted with an additional structure. Two successive events, such 
as "A spark descended into the powder keg" and "An explosion occurs" are linked 
together by means of the category of causality, and only then can they be understood 
as linked with respect to a causal law: "Because a spark descended into the powder 
keg, therefore an explosion was triggered." The spark is conceived as the cause and 
the explosion as its effect. It is only through such categorial determinations, such as 
that of causality, that natural being becomes available for knowledge, as for example 
in the aforementioned case of knowledge of causal relations. With that a principle of 
pure understanding is formulated which is constitutive for all experience. Accordingly, 
the law-like regularity of nature is essentially the result of the formative activity of 
the subject. This is emphasized in Kant's famous dictum: "The understanding does 
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not draw its laws (a priori) from nature, but rather prescribes them to it" (PR: $36; 
the original text in italics). 
With respect to the above example, this means that any natural being which 
I encounter is in principle causally conditioned. Of this I am certain prior to all 
experience - "a priori." Certainly, how the causal principle is realized in concrete 
natural laws is variable, for example as the law of gravity, as the law of the refraction 
of light, etc. Thus, with respect to their specific determinateness the natural laws cannot 
originate in the subject. 
Kant names the view he develops "transcendental." The transcendental philosophy 
is "the system of all principles of pure reason" (KVR: B27). With that, he wants 
to distance himself terminologically from a philosophy which accepts any kind 
of transcendent authority lying "beyond," and thus unavailable to, the subject. By 
contrast, according to the transcendental view the formal elements of nature reside in 
the subject prior to all experience: these are the forms of intuition, namely space and 
time, as well as the twelve categories of the understanding, which further determine the 
intuitions. We thus never have knowledge of "things in themselves," that is, things "as 
they in themselves might be." Rather, we have knowledge of appearances, i.e. of how 
things appear to us with respect to our forms of intuition and categories - whereby 
Kant explicitly remarks that "appearance" <Erscheinung> should not be equated with 
"fiction" <Schein> (KVR: B69-71). Since, however, the appearances are determined 
by our own forms (i.e. the forms of intuition and the categories), we can have a priori 
knowledge of the appearances in advance of all experience, for example that nature 
is constituted spatio-temporally and causally. Kant's transcendental approach thus 
renders valid a priori determinations of experience, and without these the scientific 
experience of law-like regularities of nature would be impossible. The aim of the 
Critique of Pure Reason is to make visible such "transcendental conditions of the possi- 
bility of experience" which exist within the subject from the outset. 
A fundamental problem with Kant's fascinating proposal is admittedly the concept 
of the thing-in-itself. This must be entirely unrecognizable, since it is in no  way liable 
to any subjective formation. It is nevertheless constitutive of Kant's position, for, as 
stated earlier, the thing-in-itself must "affect" the subject and deliver to it by means 
of this effect the "raw material of sensible perception." If the spatio-temporal and 
categorial forms which enable knowledge lie in the subject, then, in contrast, the 
sensible content must originate in a thing-in-itself which, for its part, must in principle 
lie beyond the reach of knowledge. Nevertheless Kant argues with this concept. He 
attributes existence to it, characterizes it as unknowable and yet claims to know that 
the thing-in-itself affects the subject. That, however, means that it has an effect, and 
"effect" presupposes the category of causality, which sure enough has no application 
with respect to things-in-themselves. In short, with regard to the thing-in-itself 
nothing is compatible. It is thus no  surprise that Fichte, who succeeded Kant and was 
in thorough agreement with the principle of the transcendental, set out to resolve this 
aporia . 
Though not aporetic, it is nevertheless a further serious defect that, though Kant 
certainly provided justifications within the scope of his claim, he unfortunately left 
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the claim itself unjustified. The unaccounted assumption of a thing-in-itself is but one 
facet of the problem. The assumption of a priori "forms of intuition" and categories is 
no  more justified, and this leads directly to such questions as: Why are there spatial 
and temporal forms of intuition? Why are there forms of intuition at all, and why are 
there exactly two? Why does the faculty of the understanding possess categories, and 
why are there exactly twelve? Here, Kant himself recognized the need for an expla- 
nation and, at any rate, tried to provide a rationale. He ascribed the categories to the 
capacity to judge (which itself is admittedly in need of justification) and sought to 
provide arguments for why there are exactly twelve (on this issue, see Reich 1932). 
Of particular significance for the development of German Idealism are those 
observations which Kant developed under the title of a 'Ltranscendental dialectic." 
With intuition attached to space and time, and the understanding grounded on the 
capacity to judge, Kant sees in reason the capacity to bring the rules of the under- 
standing under a principle (KVR: A302/B359), i.e. to find the unconditioned for that 
which is conditioned in multiple respects (A3071B364) and in this way to think of 
an ultimate "absolute totality" (A326lB383). Such a concept, generated by reason, is 
called a "transcendental idea" (A31 l/B368) and appears concretely in three forms - 
soul, world and God. Since they exceed the bounds of experience, such ideas have a 
transcendent character and so, Kant explains, can only function regulatively, i.e. they 
cannot lead to "hard" empirical results but rather can only guide scientific research. 
If this restriction is not born in mind, then thought inevitably becomes ensnared in 
dialectical aporias, as for example in the question of whether or not the world has a 
beginning: as Kant demonstrated, the affirmative and the negative response each leads 
to an antinomy (for critical analysis on this see Wandschneider 1989). 
While holding the "hard," empirically oriented knowledge of the understanding 
in the highest esteem, Kant clearly also allowed for the concerns of reason and, in 
particular, the question concerning the unconditioned. It is with respect to the latter 
that Kant substantially influenced the development of the "speculative" philosophy 
of German Idealism. (Of interest with respect to this point is Hegel's presentation 
of Kant's "critical philosophyn in the context of the "Encyclopedia," Hegel Werke: 
8.§§40-60.) 
Metaphysical foundations of natural science 
Published in 1786, Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science seeks to work 
out more clearly the consequences of the transcendental approach with respect to 
the natural sciences (here in particular see Plaass 1965; Schafer 1966; Hoppe 1969: 
esp. Ch. 2; Falkenburg 1987: Ch. 2). One can only speak of a real science of nature, 
according to Kant, "if the natural laws, which it takes as its basis, are known a 
priori and not as mere laws of experience" (MA: 468). What Kant has in mind is a 
metaphysics of nature (469), which consequently "is drawn from the essence of thought 
itself and is in no way a fictitious invention on account of not being borrowed from 
experience'' (472). With that, Kant is thinking of the "principles of pure understanding," 
such as the universal principle of causality, which were developed in the Critique of 
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Pure Reason under the guidance of the categories. The system of principles "provides 
the schema for the metaphysics of nature" (Schafer 1966: 24) and, with that, forms 
the general background for the empirical science of nature. For its part, however, 
this assumes collaterally the empirical existence of things and the intuition thereof. It 
thus presupposes space and time and accordingly, as Kant emphasizes, mathematics 
(geometry and arithmetic) as that which is conceptually commensurate to space and 
time - such that "in every doctrine of nature there is only so much proper science, 
. .. as there is that to which mathematics is applicable" (MA 470). Mathematical 
physics is thus distinguished from all other natural sciences. Its fundamental concept 
is a concept of matter, understood as "movable in space." This general concept, which 
nevertheless contains an empirical element (i.e. existence), is developed further by 
Kant in accordance with the categories and in a purely conceptual manner: into a 
pure doctrine of motion ("phoronomy"), a doctrine of the filling of space by forces 
("dynamics"), a doctrine of the interaction of material bodies ("mechanics"), and 
a doctrine of motion with respect to the perceiving subject ("phenomenology"). 
With that, the "metaphysical foundations" of natural science are delineated, though 
admittedly restricted to physics. Kant's doctrine of forces was repeatedly taken up in 
German Idealism, whereby the spatial reality of matter was said to be constituted by 
the opposing forces of attraction and repulsion (MA: Ch. 2). 
Critique of Judgment 
The Critique of Iudgment, published in 1790, is devoted to organic nature. It may at 
first come as a surprise that this work also contains Kant's philosophy of art. The two 
themes are connected by the concept of purposiveness, which is central for Kant's 
explanation of artistic beauty, as well as for his understanding of organic systems. 
Both parts became significant for the development of German Idealism. For present 
purposes, it is only the second part, the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," which 
is germane. 
Kant here distinguishes between "external" and "internal" purposiveness (KU: 
$63-7, $82). External purposiveness means that the determination of an object as a 
medium is a determination which is external to that object. Thus, either the determi- 
nation is accidental - as sandy soil is certainly "conducive" for forests of spruce trees, 
though it is certainly not there for the sake of the forests (KU: 280-1); or the deter- 
mination is bestowed on the object from without by means of a conscious intention of 
thought and thus represents in principle a technical determination of aims (KU: 285-6, 
289-90, 291-2). By contrast, inner purposiveness means a coherent functioning 
which is in itself purposive and whose purposive organization is not even "externally 
purposive," i.e. neither accidental nor technical but rather, as it were, consisting "of 
nature." Thus, Kant also speaks of an "end of nature" <Naturzweck> (KU: 286). It 
preserves its final character entirely on its own, independent of accidental factors or 
technical determinations of aims. The inner purposiveness of an end of nature is thus 
nothing other than its self-preservation. Thereby, the organs are means for the preser- 
vation of the entire organism. Yet the organs themselves also belong to the organism. 
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Self-preservation thus means that the organism is conversely a means for the preser- 
vation of the organs - basically, a familiar matter of fact: on the one hand, heart, 
lungs, kidneys, etc., are necessary for the functioning of the organism, and, on the 
other hand, the organism serves to ensure the functioning of these (and all remaining) 
organs. It is in this sense that Kant comes to the immediately plausible definition of 
inner purposiveness, according to which everything in an organic system "is an end 
and reciprocally also a means" (KU: 296, originally italicized). Or, in another formu- 
lation, the parts of an organism "relate to one another through the unity of a whole, 
such that they are interdependently the reciprocal cause and effect of their form" (KU: 
291). According to Kant, this thoroughgoing reciprocal relationship in the function of 
an organic totality is to be understood as the characteristic of inner purposiveness. 
With regard to realization conditions of inner purposiveness, Kant admittedly seems 
confronted with what appear to be insurmountable difficulties. He considers a causal 
explanation impossible, and that above all for two reasons: the causal relation is 
asymmetrical, i.e. unilaterally directed from cause to effect, whereas the reciprocity of 
cause and effect which is substantial for the structure of inner purposiveness would 
imply a cause which is likewise an effect and an effect which is likewise a cause (KU: 
289). Kant further asserts that causal processes are blind (270, 326), i.e. they do not 
trend in pursuit of a goal, since they alone are determined by factors which lie in the 
past and not by a goal which is first realized in the future, as is obviously the case for 
the self-preservation of an organism. One could object that even a causally determined 
process is goal-directed insofar as a future stage of the process is clearly determined by 
the past stages of that process (so e.g. Sachsse 1979: 13-18). To this one can respond 
that causally determined processes are interrupted by external influences, i.e. they are 
sidetracked from their original "goal," whereas organic behavior seeks to conform to 
its particular goal even against external disturbances. 
Kant is, however, also fundamentally skeptical with regard to his own charac- 
terization of the organic in terms of the concept of purposiueness, since this is not a 
category which is constitutive of experience (in the sense of KRV), as is the case with 
the category of causality. So, according to Kant, we can indeed be a priori certain that 
every object we encounter in experience is an object which is causally determined, 
whereas there are certainly objects which do not exhibit the inner purposiveness of 
an organism. Correspondingly, Kant says "purposiveness" should be merely a "subjectiue 
principle (maxim) of judgment" which, as such, guarantees nothing with respect to 
the qualities of objects (KU: xxxiv). It is "a mere idea" (318), a regulative and not a 
constitutive principle (see e.g. 301, 331), which can only serve to "reflect" on nature 
but not determine its objective being (e.g. xxvi-xxviii, 345). 
The reason for the merely subjective-regulative character of the principle of purpo- 
siveness can be seen, for Kant, in the involvement of the concept of a n  end. Whoever 
judges organisms to be purposive ultimately considers them to be the result of an 
intentional, thinking goal-directed activity and thus as analogous to technical creations 
(269,309,333-8,345-6,374). And this is akin to the model of external purposiveness 
which, as technical, presupposes a rational positing of ends. 
So neither the concept of causality nor the concept of an end (which is presupposed 
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in the principle of purposiveness) is, in Kant's view, sufficient for explaining the reali- 
zation conditions of inner purposiveness. In view of the incontestable facts of physical 
structures, which nevertheless suggest a compelling purposive explanation, Kant 
entertains the speculative thought of a supersensory substratum of nature, i.e. that of 
reason inheringin nature itself (KU: xx, lvi, 304,316-17,352-3,357-63,374 -here, see 
Bartuschat 1972: 2 15-1 7, 253-5; Diising 1968: 108-10, 116-18). The starting-point 
here is the moral philosophical consideration that the will which is determined by 
practical reason should also be able to manifest itself in real action and thus ultimately 
in physical relations. That, however, is only possible, Kant suspects, if nature itself is 
not ultimately exempt from reason. Consequently, there should be "a ground for the 
unity of the supersensory which grounds nature with that which is contained in the 
practical concept of freedom" (xx). Accordingly, reason would no longer be a mere 
subjective instance but rather, as it were, a "supersensory real ground [Realgrund] for 
nature, . . . to which we ourselves belong" (352). It would thus no  longer be merely the 
foundation of thinking but rather the foundation of all beings; reason would no  longer 
have merely moral relevance but rather would possess ontological relevance in the 
sense of a logos which underlies subject and object alike. From there it would at least 
be plausible that, on the one hand, natural objects could be organized purposively in 
the sense of "inner" purposiveness and, on the other hand, the subject's reason could 
be capable of adequately grasping the purposiveness of nature. With respect to Kant's 
difficulties with the realization conditions of inner purposiveness, the ontological 
thought of a rational substratum of nature must have seemed exceptionally attractive. 
And nowhere is he closer to the thought of German Idealism, in particular the kinds 
of "objective idealism" advocated by Schelling and Hegel, than here. 
With that, Kant admittedly abandoned the transcendental view of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, a view which had deprived reason of an ontological status and accorded 
it the sole function of regulating knowledge. Kant shied away from this consequence. 
Commensurate with a concept of knowledge which is restricted to knowledge of nature, 
Kant is convinced that, with respect to a possible supersensory-rational substratum of 
nature, we can have "for theoretical purposes not the slightest affirmative determinate 
concept" (KU: 358). The ontological thought of a logos which underlies nature was 
again withdrawn, and thus the possibility of grasping the inner purposiveness of the 
organic as a reason which inheres in nature itself was discarded (see Heintel 1966). 
The only form in which we are capable of thinking of organic purposiveness is thus 
the teleological explanation, which remains oriented to a technical model - thus it is as 
if organisms were constructed by a "highest architect" (354). It is clear that one thus 
only arrives at an external purposiveness, which as such presupposes an ideal antici- 
pation of an end. Kant expressed this aporia in terms of the impossibility of a "Newton 
of the blade of grass" (338, also 353), he thus expresses regret that the principle of 
inner purposiveness possesses the status of a merely regulative idea for human thought, 
a regulative idea for which no  realization conditions are assignable and thus which 
facilitates no scientific knowledge of the organic. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, as well as in both the Metaphysical Foundations 
and the Critique of Judgment, there remains open a fundamental question which 
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was clearly articulated in the last of these works: namely, the question touched on 
earlier concerning empirical laws of nature, such as the law of gravitation. According 
to Kant, what is determined transcendentally is only the general character of its 
law-likeness, not its specific content. The reason for this undoubtedly is Kant's 
assumption that in the process of experience the subject is first "affected" by a thing- 
in-itself which delivers empirical content. In doing so, the thing-in-itself remains 
subjectively inaccessible and therewith anyway transcendentally inexplicable. In the 
Critique of Judgment, this is in principle addressed in the distinction between deter- 
minant and reflective judgment: "If the universal (i.e. the rule, the principle, the law) is 
given, then the judgment, which subsumes the particular under it, is . . . determinant. 
If, however, only the particular is given, for which it must find the universal, then the 
judgment is merely reflective." In other words, reflective judgment can only establish 
an "as if principle" through which it gives "only a law unto itself and not a law of 
nature" (xxviii). It is ultimately the previously mentioned thing-in-itself which is 
problematic for the Kantian system. 
Opus Pos tumum 
Kant did not let this problem rest but rather continually circled it and sought to 
resolve it, as can be seen in the Opus Postumum. I have only a few remarks on this 
point. Certainly, the Opus Postumum could not have had a direct influence on German 
Idealism since it was first published in 1936-8 - aside from Kant's public declarations 
concerning Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. Nevertheless, it is a document of the historical- 
intellectual situation within which German Idealism arose, and, as it demonstrates, 
Kant himself was already en route to an idealistic position (instructive here is Mathieu 
1989; Tuschling 1995). 
Here, reflective judgment no  longer appears to have only an "as if principle" 
through which it can create only a system unto itself. Rather, as Vittorio Mathieu 
noticed, this "in point of fact is claimed categorically as a system which is concerned 
with reality itself, and the judgment which erects the system gives the law not only 
'unto itself' but also 'to nature"' (Mathieu 1989: 44). That which earlier was asserted 
to be empirically valid has now become an "a priori given matter" which "is not 
concerned with the senses but rather with reason" (Kant, Opus Postumum, cited in 
Mathieu 1989: 276). The empirical ultimately resolves itself into mere relationships, 
i.e. the form becomes the "object itself' (Mathieu 1989: 276-7). Burkhard Tuschling 
notes that in the Opus postumum Kant, as it were, reverts to Spinoza and Leibniz. 
Schelling named Kant "the Leibniz of our epoch" and understood his Transcendental 
Idealism as Spinozism (Tuschling 1995: 209). This is an astonishing about-face of 
the once most critical Kant which only illustrates the historical-intellectual trend 
initiated by Kant himself: namely, that one must think further both with and against 
Kant, and that the consistent elaboration of his project must lead to German Idealism. 
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Schelling 
The inclusion of nature 
In fact this development began during Kant's lifetime. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762- 
1814) was emphatically persuaded of the fundamental correctness of the Kantian 
view. Its greatest shortcoming - the assumption of a thing-in-itself - Fichte considered 
reparable, and his entire system is in effect an attempt to realize Kant's transcendental 
thought without the ominous thing-in-itself (Fichte Werke: 1:420). Fichte referred 
to Kant's concept of transcendental apperception and from there undertook an ultimate 
justification from the I. For Fichte, the I can in no way be circumvented, because every 
attempt at a derivation of the I already presupposes the I. In the immediate awareness 
of the 1's self-performing one can find the ground of being which cannot be derived 
from anywhere else and from which the transcendental philosophy must originate. 
This is also true of Fichte's claims about nature, for which the perspective of the 
transcendental philosophy is consistently determinant and, with that, the relation 
to the I. So, for Fichte there arises from the moral constitution of human beings the 
ontological demand that nature must exist in such a way as to allow for the existence 
and moral action of the I. It is in this sense that one should understand the famous 
claim that the world is "nothing more than . . . the sensualized material of our duty; 
this is what is actually real in things, the true elementary material of all appearance" 
(5:184-5). Significantly, there is from Fichte no  monograph on the philosophy of 
nature. Apparently, there was a plan for such a monograph, but it was never carried 
out (Widmann 1982: 131). Fichte's "scattered remarks" on nature (Lauth 1984: xvii) 
were compiled and presented by Reinhard Lauth. 
Originally a strong adherent to Fichte's philosophy, Schelling eventually raised 
fundamental objections against it. Some of these took a polemical form (e.g. Schelling 
Werke: 7:23), but very soon he  emphasized the necessity for a philosophy of nature in 
its own right and criticized Fichte for having totally failed to provide one. 
Chronologically, Schelling (1775-1854) follows Hegel (1770-1831). But from an 
intellectual-historical standpoint, Schelling is positioned prior to Hegel. The latter's 
publishing activity begins later, and his writings presupposed Schelling's philosophical 
perspective. 
Above all, Schelling's early work is concerned with nature. The  reasons for this are 
manifold. O n  the one hand, Kant is a leading figure, and his transcendental interpre- 
tation had opened up an entirely new perspective on nature. This is especially true of 
Kant's "transcendental dialectic" (Jacobs 1998: 69, 77), the Metaphysical Foundations 
of Natural Science (Matsuyama 2000), and the "Critique of Teleological Judgment" 
(Diising 1985: 203-7; Franz 1998: 86-8). O n  the other hand, Fichte's transcendental 
philosophy was significant for Schelling, though he soon noticed problems with that 
approach, in particular Fichte's sweeping characterization of nature as a non-I: "It is as 
if Fichte perceived in the external world no differences whatsoever. For him, nature so 
fades away into the abstract, mere limiting concept <cine bloJ3e Schranke bezeichnenden 
Begriff> of the non-I, of a completely empty object, .. . that he no  longer thinks a 
deduction which extends beyond this concept is necessary" (10:90-1). As can be 
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seen from Schelling's university notes his path to the transcendental philosophy also 
proceeded by way of an intensive engagement with Plato's interpretation of nature in 
the Timaeus (1794) (Sandkaulen-Bock: 1990, 19-21; Franz 1998: 60-4; Jantzen 1998: 
85-6). Here, what admittedly concerned Schelling was not the thematic of nature 
but rather the idea of transcendental philosophy: in the "divine understanding" of 
the demiurge he sees "in nuce already manifest the model of an 'absolute I,," and 
that remarkably "several months before the appearance of Fichte's programmatic work 
O n  the Concept of a Science of Nature" (Franz 1998: 63; see also Jantzen 1998: 85-6). 
Schelling's philosophical orientation nevertheless went in a completely different 
direction from that of Fichte. As Wilhelm G. Jacobs has shown, in contrast to Fichte 
what was of primary interest to Schelling was not Kant's theory of the transcendental 
constitution of objects but rather Kant's problem of the transcendental dialectic: in 
the product of nature as a conditioned - Spinoza's natura naturata -he  saw a reference 
to the idea of an unconditioned (Wieland 1967: 416)' of a divine self-producing 
nature, thus in the sense of Spinoza's natura naturans (Jacobs 1998: 69, 77), in which 
nature itself acquires the character of an absolute subject: "Nature considered as a mere 
product (natura naturata) is what we call nature as object (this alone is the object of all 
empirical investigation). Nature considered as productivity (natura naturans) is what we 
call nature as subject (this alone is the object of all theoretical inquiry)" (3:284) which 
is, for Fichte, an unthinkable position. 
Schelling's first great work on the philosophy of nature, entitled Ideas for a 
Philosophy of Nature, appeared in 1797 and was followed by additional works on this 
subject: O n  the World-Soul (1798), First Draft of a System of the Philosophy of Nature 
(1799)' Introduction to the Draft of a System of the Philosophy of Nature (1799), Universal 
Deduction of the Dynamic Processes or of the Categories of Physics (1800). And even 
though the philosophy of nature is not implied in the title of Schelling's System 
of Transcendental Idealism (1800), it is nevertheless a central theme of that work. 
Additional writings on the philosophy of nature followed, now within the framework 
of Schelling's meanwhile conceived "philosophy of identity": O n  the True Concept of 
the Philosophy of Nature and the Correct Method for Solving its Problems (1801) and 
Presentation of My System of Philosophy (1801). Additional works which treat exten- 
sively of the philosophy of nature include: Bruno, or O n  the Divine and Natural Principle 
of Things (1802), Further Presentations from the System of Philosophy (1802)' the essay 
O n  the Relation of Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy, in General (1802), System of the 
Entire Philosophy and of the Philosophy of Nature, in Particular (1804)' Presentation of 
the True Relation of the Philosophy of Nature to the Emended Doctrine of Fichte (1806), 
Aphorisms for an Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature (1806), and Aphorisms on 
the Philosophy of Nature (1806). A subsequent work marks a turning-point, namely, 
Philosophical Investigations on the Essence of Human Freedom and its related Objects 
(1809)' in which Schelling addresses the origin of evil. Nevertheless, the philosophy 
of nature remains a constitutive part of Schelling's philosophical framework, as is 
apparent in the Private Lectures in Stuttgart (1810) and in the lectures given in Munich 
entitled, On the History of the New Philosophy (1827). 
Admittedly, one cannot speak of a continuity of argument. The dynamic of his 
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"eruptive thinking" leads Schelling to ever new, "interwoven" schemes (Wieland 
1967: 408) to such an extent that it is difficult to claim any one of these works 
represents the philosophy of nature of Schelling. Thus, it is only in its historical devel- 
opment that an appropriate presentation could be given of Schelling's philosophy of 
nature (as is done by Jantzen 1998) - or perhaps not even in this manner (Wieland 
1967: 408). Since in the present context describing the historical development is not 
even remotely possible, another approach must be found. It seems reasonable to orient 
the presentation in terms of the later statements which Schelling formulated in retro- 
spect of his own development and the continually broadening philosophical horizon, 
such as those claims advanced in the above mentioned lectures from Stuttgart and 
Munich. The earlier writings, however, must also be kept in view. 
The way out of the absolute 
Schelling's thought systematically takes as its point of departure the question as to why 
nature exists, at all. It is at the same time a question about the absolute which preoc- 
cupied Schelling throughout his life (Wieland 1967: 419). Birgit Sandkaulen-Bock 
(1990) has demonstrated in impressive detail how complex and varied the argumen- 
tative structure of Schelling's early thought is. Given the chosen methodological 
principle, I will instead here consider Schelling's reflections from the Munich lectures 
On the History of the New Philosophy (1827, published from the hand-written Nachlass). 
In "complete independence from Fichte" - Schelling is clearly referring to his 
later positions - it is not the finite, human I which constitutes the original point 
of departure but rather the "infinite subject" which qua infinite "can never cease to 
be subject" (10:99). As subject, however, it is "as it were, natural" for it also to "will 
[itself] as object" (10:99), "for it is only subject in that it becomes an object unto itself, 
since it is assumed there is nothing external to it which could become an object for 
it" (10:lOl). The subject becomes object for itself and, in so doing, first becomes 
something: this is the primum Existens, the first being. It is essential, however, that 
in its "becoming an object it never ceases to be subject." For this reason, it must be 
an "infinite self-positing" (10:lOl): "Insofar as it is something, it is also immediately 
once more that which goes beyond itself' (10:103). In other words, it posits itself as 
finite so that, in the continually renewed sublation of the finite, it can grasp itself as 
infinite (10:lOl-2), so to speak on "a second level or potency" (10:102). Through this 
potentizing <Potenzierung>, it is no  longer only subject (A) but rather now explicitly 
determined as subject: A qua A, or as Schelling characterized it, A' (10:103). The self- 
finitizing subject posits itself as something real in order to know itself in this positing as 
subject, and this knowledge is itself something ideal (10:103-4). 
According to Schelling, that "first being" is nothing other than matter: "This matter, 
which itself is only the first existing something, is certainly not the matter which we 
now see before us, the formed, . . . already corporeal matter." O n  the contrary, it is "the 
matter of this matter, the matter of that which is already formed and a sensible object 
of knowledge for us, . . . its stuff, its foundation" (10:104) which, as such, can assume 
a spatial form and so is like an "original filling of space" (Heckmann 1985: 303). The 
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ideal which stands opposite this real is fundamentally a "knowing" and is identified 
by Schelling as light, and that apparently because the latter represents the fact that 
matter can be known. "Compared with matter the light is as nothing and yet it is not 
nothing; that which, in matter, is as something is, in the light, as nothing; and to that 
extent it is admittedly also something, yet something different, posited as the pure 
ideal. The light is apparently not matter, to which earlier hypotheses had reduced it." 
O n  the contrary, as ideal the light is "the objectively self-positing" "concept of matter" 
(10:lOS). 
That the infinite subject thus realizes itself in original matter and light is, for 
Schelling, the rationale for the existence of nature. I use this formulation for the 
time being in order to first characterize Schelling's line of thought in its context. It is 
essential for "this philosophy" that it "begins from nature" (10:106-7). The philosophy 
of nature is accordingly its "first part, or the foundation of the whole." What also arises 
from this is the quasi-ambivalent character of nature: more objective in the form of 
original matter, more subjective in the form of light. Directed against Fichte, the claim 
is that nature is not merely a non-I, something merely objective, but rather something 
- such as light - which always also has an ideal, subjective character. "Nowhere, in no 
sphere is there a merely subjective or a merely objective but rather always the unity of 
both. . . . Only against a still higher ideal, e.g. against human knowledge, and thus in 
general only relative, does the light belong respectively to the real world" (10:106). 
To this extent, this philosophy can be characterized neither as idealism nor as realism 
but only properly as "real-idealism" (10:107). Both the real and the ideal arise from 
an identical root, namely from that "single ultimate subject" (10:107). So understood, 
the philosophy of nature, as Schelling himself presents it, evidently amounts to a 
philosophy of identity (10:107). 
This position was initially set out in Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealtsm 
(1800). The title suggests a proximity to Fichte. However, that absolute subject 
presented by Schelling is no longer the pure self-consciousness from which Fichte had 
started but rather an absolute which underlies every conditioned. In this, Schelling's 
affinlty to Spinoza becomes visible -with the qualification, however, that this absolute 
is no  longer thought Spinozistically as a highest being but rather as a subject. As finite 
subjects, we can only have knowledge of this by means of intellectual intuition, that is, 
through an immediate, non-sensible, holistic apprehension of the absolute (of the 
kind which is imparted paradigmatically by works of art (3:625); on the problematic 
of intellectual intuition, see Wieland 1967: 417-20). And this must take the form of a 
single identity which encompasses the ideal and the real and which lies ahead of each; 
an identity which Schelling also characterizes as indifference because it is neither the 
one nor the other. For this reason, according to Schelling, the subject never has only 
an ideal character, but also always has a real character. Similarly, the object never has 
only a real but also an ideal character: "neither is ever separate, rather they are orlgi- 
nally together (also in nature) (4237; 6:204-10). Conditioned through the identity 
realized In the absolute, everything is both subject and object, subject-object, as it were 
- though with a preponderance of the subjective in the subjects and a preponderance 
of the objective in the objects: the subject as subjective subject-object and the object 
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as objective subject-object. Correspondingly, philosophy must necessarily pursue two 
opposed directions: as transcendental philosophy it commences from the ideal in order to 
explam the real in terms of it - this is essentially still Fichte's program. As philosophy of 
nature it commences from the real in order to explain the ideal in terms of it - this is 
new and contrary to Fichte, who could only shake his head disapprovingly: "Nature is 
the product of intelligence, so how can it be, without entering an obvious circle, that 
intelligence is the product of nature!" (Fichte GA: II/5:421-2). Within the framework 
of the system of identity which Schelling developed in the period from 1801 to 1806, 
both philosophies belong constitutively together. However, in the justificatory essay On 
the True Concept of the Philosophy of Nature and the Correct Method for Solving its Problems 
(1801) Schelling emphasized the "priority" of the philosophy of nature: "because this 
first allows for the standpoint of idealism to arise and by means of this creates a secure, 
pure theoretical foundation for idealism" (4:92), so that "knowledge . . . only proceeds 
through the gates of the knowledge of nature to the knowledge of the divine principle" 
(4:424). The philosophy of nature provides something like "a physical explanation 
of idealism. . . . Come here to physics and recognize what is true!" (4:76; 3:378) - by 
"physics" Schelling here means that which he  also refers to as "speculative physics," thus 
philosophy of nature (3:274-82; Wieland 1967: 435-6; Krings 1985; Meyer 1985), or 
the "depth grammar of nature," as it were (Kanitschneider 1985: 246). And the system 
of philosophy should prove "that without the philosophy of nature no  philosophy, i.e. 
knowledge and science of the absolute, obtains at all, and that the former is a necessary 
and essential part of the latter" (4:424). This is "the only thinkable idealism" which 
is namely "simultaneously a complete realism" (4:148). Birgit Sandkaulen-Bock has 
made clear the implicit aporias of this position (1990: 95-8). 
The fundamental structures of nature 
Fichte's "complete manslaughter of nature" (7:445) is, for Schelling, a philosophically 
unacceptable defect which the philosophy of nature shall now remedy. In his writings, 
Schelling offers various arguments to explain the concrete structures of nature. The 
aforementioned doctrine of potency is, however, a relatively consistent methodological 
approach. I focus here on the detailed statement offered in the 1801 published 
work Presentation of My System of Philosophy (Werke: Vol. 4,), in which Schelling 
also continually refers to arguments advanced in the earlier published System of 
Transcendental Idealism (Werke: Vol. 3). A modified version of the potency doctrine 
can also be found in the Stuttgart Private Lectures (1810) (Werke: Vol. 7) and in the 
Munich Lectures from 1827 (Werke: Vol. 10). 
As already expounded, Schelling argues that the pure subject, symbolized by A, 
must become objective for itself, symbolized by B, thus in sum A=B, though not in the 
sense of a mathematical equation but rather as the self-objectification of A: "It wills 
itself, and so becomes another, unlike itself' (10:102). Therewith exists a first, original 
being, an original matter, a subject-object A=B, through which A and B appear as 
polar forces: B as an "infinite expansive force," A as "an opposed, negative impeding 
force" corresponding to the "limiting activity of the I" (3:441; 4:145-8). These forces 
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are said to constitute matter and thus are not merely properties of matter (Jantzen 1998: 
91). The synthesis of both forces should - in contrast to Kant (Matsuyama 2000: 
59-62) - be a third, force constitutively combined with matter, namely the gravita- 
tional force (3:444; 4:145-8), "which expresses nothing other than the infinite striving 
of nature to return to that absolute identity out of which nature, through the initial 
rupture, was torn" (4:7). From the threefold nature of these forces Schelling believes 
he is able to derive the three-dimemional nature of matter (3:444-9; modified in 7:447; 
Ziche 2004). 
Schelling explains (4:149-51) that A is first determined as A, as subjective, through 
its opposition to B, and this is symbolized as A2. But this subjective being exists on 
the (A=B)-level of the original matter, as a "subjective-material," so to speak. This 
is a (relatively) immaterial being which, as stated earlier, Schelling identifies with 
light. It is, as it were, the representative of absolute identity in reality ("In light, the 
absolute identity itself arises and in reality," Werke: 4:163) - or more generally as 
form which as such has an immaterial character. Therewith emerges a new polarity 
between subjective and objective, namely that of lightlform (A2), on the one hand, 
and of materiality (A=B), on the other. This new polarity is symbolized by A2=(A=B); 
again, this should not be understood as a mathematical equation but rather in terms 
of the described subject-object-schema. This new subject-object thus represents the 
combination of materiality and immaterial form, and, according to Schelling, this 
is - in contrast to the still formless original matter - the formed, different matter. 
The formation processes of matter thus operate at the level which is determined by 
A2=(A=B), which Schelling refers to as the level of dynamic processes. Differentiated 
matter appears at this level and, with that, novel polarities: the inseparable polarity 
of magnetism, the separable polarity of electrical charges, and the combination of both 
- as Schelling suggests - in the chemical process. He explains these as polarities in the 
determination of identity, duplicity and totality. The magnetic, the electrical, and the 
chemical are thus said to be the three fundamental categories of differentiated, formed 
matter (10:109) whose dynamic results from the striving for the sublimation of the 
polar difference: "Nature strives necessarily in dynamic processes toward the absolute 
indifference" (4: 18 1, italicized in original). 
All of this is scarcely comprehensible in the way of argument. Empirically, however, 
it is not necessarily absurd. In Jena, Schelling had made the acquaintance of the 
physicist Johann Wilhelm Ritter (1776-1810) and became interested in the latter's 
research. Additionally, Schelling's "dynamic" conception of natural phenomena 
(Jantzen 1998: 91-2; Matsuyama 2000) received an essential impulse from his studies 
of the mechanical-atomistic physics of the Swiss natural scientist Georges-Luis Le 
Sage (1724-1803) (Kiippers 1992: 68-73). Beyond that, Schelling was familiar with 
contemporary empirical research (Wieland 1967: 436; Engelhardt 1985: 40-6). 
However, Schelling's attempts to ground this systematically and to interpret it in 
natural philosophical terms nevertheless come across as improvised and ad-hoc. 
It is through the relation A2=(A=B), which is determinant at the dynamic level, 
that, in Schelling's terminology, the subjective instance again as such becomes 
concrete in the higher potency A3 (4:200). This is said to be the organism (4:202; 
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10:llO; Frank 1998). The level of animate nature is characterized accordingly in 
the formula A3= (A2= (A=B) ) (4:205). With that, the life-process presupposes the 
level of the dynamic process (AZ=(A=B)) but surpasses it through the efficacy of 
the organismic principle A3, by means of which the organism is essentially subject. 
The pronounced subjective moment prevents the difference which preserves the life 
process from becoming indifference and thus from coming to rest, as is the case with 
a dynamic process (such as a chemical reaction) (2:500, 3:150, 322-5). "Matter is 
thus no longer considered as substance; in fact, the organism does not exist as such 
through material substance, which continually changes, but rather only through 
the type or form of its material being - is it an organism. . . . For life, it is the form 
which has become essential . . ., the preservation of substance in this form, in which 
it is even the form of existence of a higher potency (A3)" (10:llO; 7:451). Stated 
in contemporary terms, the organism is a self-preserving and self-organizing system. 
Indeed, like a stone or a machine, it consists of "normal" matter. However, what is 
characteristic of an organism is not the elementary lawfulness of matter but rather the 
lawfulness of the system; building on the elementary laws which first become visible at 
the level of the system, at which point it "emerges." To this extent, Schelling here 
has already caught sight of an emergence-theoretical perspective. The organism is "the 
higher potency of the category of interaction" (3:495). Drawing on Kant's notion of 
teleological judgment, Schelling thus attributes to the organism inner purposiveness 
(a product in which "everything is reciprocally means and end," Werke: 3:186). The 
categories of magnetism, electricity, and the chemical have been determinant for the 
dynamic process with respect to identity, duplicity, and totality. Now - drawing on 
the analyses of Albrecht von Haller and Carl Friedrich Kielmeyer (Jantzen 1998: 98) 
- sensibility (organization of the senses), irritability (an organism-specific reaction) and 
power of reproduction (self-peservation in a dynamic process) are the analogous deter- 
minations for the life-process (e.g. 3:155-240, 3:325, 7:452; Engelhardt 1985: 48-9). 
Accordingly, "organic nature [is] nothing other than the inorganic repeating itself at 
a higher potency" (44) .  For Schelling, the plant represents a preliminary stage of life, 
whereas the animal represents that of a true organism (2:495). 
Finally, in the life-process which is characterized by A3=(A2=(A=B)), the subjective 
instance A3 again becomes concrete as such and thus appears as a yet higher potency 
A4, which Schelling also characterized as the "absolute A2." The reason for this is 
that, by comparison, the organic and the inorganic opposed to A4 have again thereby 
assumed the fundamental position of B (7455). This, according to Schelling, is "the 
point of transfiguration of nature" (7:454): A4 "is external or above nature, but it is 
nevertheless efficacious within nature; it is not cut-off from nature but rather stands 
in contrast to it as the universal stimulus <Erregende> of nature" (7455). This is 
said to be "the birth of man, with which nature as such is complete, and a new 
world - a completely new series of developments - begins," namely, in the medium 
of "knowledge" (10:112, for more on this see the following subsection, "Potentizing as 
the Ground for the Gradual Structure of Nature"). A t  the same time, it is clear that 
this highest level of subjective potency presupposes all of the lower levels, "for the 
subsequent moment must always retain the preceding moment as its immediate basis" 
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(10:113). While knowledge is related to all of its preceding levels, it is at the same 
time assigned the task of apprehending these and therewith of providing an explanation 
on the basis of transcendental principles. This process of cognition is thus "parallel" 
to the progressive gradation process of nature: "But the difference is that everything 
which there is real here proceeds only in the ideal" (10:114). 
Corresponding to the trio of polarity, duplicity and totality there is at the spiritual 
level, and thus for humans, a series of henceforth spiritual potencies. For the mind, 
Schelling mentions: longing, desire, feeling; for the spirit (in the narrow, personal 
sense): egoism, understanding, will; and for the soul, which is understood to be supra- 
personal and divine: art, philosophy (later: religion), morality (later: philosophy - the later 
structuring is thus equivalent to that of the absolute spirit in Hegel). Here, it is worth 
mentioning that on the basis of these topics Schelling also developed a theory of 
illnesses and, in particular, of mental illnesses (e.g. "melancholyn) (Engelhardt 1984a). 
Schelling's conception of an original identity which both precedes the real and the 
ideal, alike, and underlies the potency doctrine also implies that the whole of nature 
possesses not only the character of an object but also the character of a subject. It is not 
only natura naturata, or nature as product, but also - in opposition to the Cartesian 
concept of nature - essentially animate, creating nature, natura naturans. Schelling 
took as the tkle of his 1798 published work on the philosophy of nature a concept 
from ancient philosophy, namely, that of the world-soul. The finite and the infinite are 
accordingly "united" such that they "constitute only one and the same irresolvable 
absolute" (2:370, 46-7). The protagonist of the romantic philosophy formulated the 
matter in complete conformity with "hen kai pan" (oneness of all), the motto of the 
three friends - Schelling, Hegel, Holderlin - studying in the Tiibingen Stift: "the 
whole of nature [is] connected to a universal organism," and in "that being, which 
the most ancient philosophy [had considered] the common soul of nature" (2:569) 
Schelling saw the "world-soul" (2:369). Nature is thus also an appearance of the 
absolute; matter is "nothing other than the unconscious part of God" (7:435), "the 
extinguished spirit," as it were (3:182; 453), "the embodiment of divine forces and 
the first image of the universe" (7:210); nature in its entirety is "the visible spirit," 
and spirit conversely is "the invisible nature" (2:56). It is clear that in this idealisti- 
cally turned Spinozism - Leibniz is also repeatedly mentioned in this context (e.g. at 
2:20; see also Holz 1984; Matsuyama 2000: 65-8) - there lies the decisive difference 
between Schelling's and Fichte's understanding of the absolute as I (instructive on this 
point is Sandkaulen-Bock 1990). 
Spirit at last arrives at the knowledge that the entirety of nature is the work of that 
self-recognizing "one subjectivity" which precedes everything. It comes to realize that 
it therefore only understands nature as something external to itself because nature - 
although a product of subjectivity - is produced unconsciously, not consciously and 
deliberately: that would be an absurd "subjective idealism" ?I la Fichte, for even "the 
most thoroughgoing idealist cannot avoid thinking of the I, concerning its ideas of the 
external world, as something dependent" (10:92; 7:445). Thus, the productive activity 
of the I can only "be a blind productive activity which is grounded not in the will 
but rather in the nature of the I." Philosophy must therefore "assume a region beyond 
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that of the now existing consciousness and an activity which itself no longer comes 
directly to consciousness but rather only through its result." This then "is just the 
external world of which the I can become conscious, not as something which it has 
itself produced but rather as something which exists simultaneous with it." It is in this 
sense that Schelling speaks of "the history of self-consciousness" (4:78) and of "the 
transcendental past (italics added) which precedes real, or empirical, consciousness" 
(10:93). Thus understood, nature is, "as it were, a fossilized intelligence" (4:77) which 
is then reconstructed in the consciousness of the philosopher (Wieland 1967: 421-6; 
Krings 1985: 116). 
Potentigng as the ground for the gradual structure of nature 
In the potency doctrine, the fundamental ideas of Schelling's philosophy of nature 
are contained, as it were, in nuce. The "potentizing" is supposed to ground the gradual 
construction of nature - though admittedly not as an evolutionary process (Jantzen 
1998: 101). Its principle is as follows: "that which was posited subjectively on a 
previous level itself always becomes objective on the subsequent level" (10:108). 
The elementary contrast between subject and object thereby forms the original 
duality, i.e. the original identity experiences a rupture which strives for a sublation 
and a return to identity. Duality is accordingly "the condition of all formation" (3:299), 
the ground of all activity (3:325), its goal is the return to identity. Thus, identity and 
duality form the basic structure of natural phenomena. With this, Schelling has in 
mind a kind of dialectic of nature which results from the potency doctrine and which 
makes comprehensible the gradual structure of nature. Every level arises from the 
opposition between the subjective and the objective. However, in this opposition the 
subject is again posited as such, i.e. it is reflected in itself and, through this "poten- 
tizing," again generates a higher level. 
The potentizing thus appears as a heightening, mediated by the objectification of 
the subjective moment of a level which in this way becomes increasingly explicit. It 
is the process of the self-objectification of the subjective which generates these levels 
and repeats itself at each one. At the lowest level of matter, the subjective is still 
obscure. A t  the level of the dynamic process, it appears as light. In the organism, it 
is the active, self-preserving universal of its species. And as spirit it is the subjective 
itself as such, admittedly also here in its opposition to the objective world - from this 
perspective, it is nature. Accordingly, spirit and nature belong substantially together. 
Nature appears as de-potentized spirit, and spirit as potentized nature. Moreover, for 
spirit as the highest level, all of the peceding lower levels remain presupposed. 
With what right can Schelling claim that the spirit (A4) which follows upon 
the organic level is the highest? How does this form the conclusion of the process of 
potentizing? Why is the process of nature completed in this way? Schelling explains 
it is brought to conclusion in that "intelligence is compelled [here] to intuit itself as 
identical with itself' (3:497), and thus the subject in potency A4 to material being has 
"still only an ideal relation" (10:112; 7:455), "thus [is] pure knowing, i.e. pure spirit, . . . 
because it already has the entire being outside of itself, for in itself it is not another but 
81 
GERMAN IDEALISM 
is rather the same subject which in its first and immediate activity became matter, and 
then in a higher potency appears as light, and in a still higher one as the principle of 
life" (10:113). The goal and culmination of this movement is thus "the most perfect 
object." Its perfection arises from the fact that the subject has finally become wholly 
objective: the "subject posited as such" is "that which is no longer able to become 
objective (because all forms are realized)." "The subject has the necessary tendency 
toward the objective, and in this it exhausts itself' (10:108). 
Admittedly, this argument that already "all forms are realized" (10:108) actually 
explains nothing, for it is only the repeating of the claim in a different form. Now, 
the potentizing of the organic process means that the active, animate principle of 
the organism, and thus its subjectivity as such, becomes objective. Assuming that 
this is an ideal, the sphere of materiality is in fact left behind. Here, one can think 
of the emerging dominance of the principle of form, biologically of the universal of 
species, and thus of the system-lawfulness as such which Schelling has in view when 
he emphasizes the independence of constantly changing matter (10:110; 7451). 
However, that is conceived more intuitively through the experience of the organism and 
is not actually "deduced." 
Criticism 
This is in general characteristic of Schelling's procedure. He draws upon a powerful 
intuition. Providing a thorough and systematic explanation of this intuition, however, 
is not one of Schelling's proper strengths. Rather, Schelling too easily succumbs to the 
tendency to rashly appropriate the empirical data of contemporary natural scientific 
research for philosophical purposes (Meyer 1985: 136-7; Mutschler 1990: 93-108), 
and this occasionally leads him to adventurous interpretations. That "electricity 
never becomes active without having been created through either rubbing or some 
other cause of asymmetrical heating" (2476); that "the general tendency of chemical 
processes" is "to transform all matter into water" (4:196; italicized in the original); 
that "water [is] completely de-potentized iron" (4:197); that plants and animals are 
opposing poles among which gravitational force appears (4:202): these are but a few of 
the various examples of nonsense in Schelling's writings on the philosophy of nature. 
In contrast to this, his great achievement lies in his overcoming of Fichte's 
subjective idealism. The philosophy of nature confronts the transcendental philosophy 
on equal footing. Nature is recognized as existing in its own right, and, with that, 
Fichte's absurd asymmetry between the I and nature is rectified. Correspondingly, for 
Schelling, nature and spirit are ultimately "not two distinct worlds but rather only 
one and the same" (4:102; 6:204-8). This is intuitively much more plausible than the 
pre-eminence which Fichte accords to the I. 
Philosophically, however, reasons are also required. Schelling seeks to develop a 
concept of nature which has as its ground the absolute. This he determines as an 
original identity - or also as an indifference - of subject and object which externalizes 
itself into the duality of subject and object, though only insofar as both are likewise 
subject and object, thus subject-object, with a mere excess of either the subjective 
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or the objective. The fundamental problem with this construction is this: why does 
absolute identity externalize itself, at all? Why does it not simply remain as identity? 
(Kippers 1992: 50). 
Now, as Hegel stated in his early essay On the Difference Between the Systems of 
Philosophy of Fichte and Schelling (1801), the whole is "represented as a self-construction 
of the absolute" (Hegel Werke: 2.1 11 ). The process of self-externalization must accord- 
ingly proceed from the absolute itself. Schelling takes this into account when, as we saw 
earlier, he retrospectively presents his own argument in the Munich lectures (1827): 
the absolute is essentially subject. In order to grasp itself as subject, however, it is "as it 
were natural" that it also "will itself as object" (10:381), "for only in this is it subject, 
that it becomes an object unto itself, since it is presupposed that there is nothing 
external to it which could become an object for it" (10:383). Schelling thus seeks to 
explain the externalization of the absolute by attributing to it a subjective character. 
This admittedly raises questions: the pretended absolute identity of subject and object 
ultimately appears again as subject. O n  the one hand, this is so because the absolute 
- in true Fichtean form - can only be thought as self-positing. This is a constitutive 
condition of its absoluteness, and in this manner Spinoza's error of a dogmatically 
claimed absolute being is avoided. O n  the other hand, it is qua subjective character 
that the movement of the absolute out of itself becomes conceivable. This recourse to 
subjectivity means that difference is always already implicitly put into the purported 
identity (Lauth 1984: 224) and thus that the basic approach of the philosophy of 
identity cannot be maintained. Instead, it again veers off in a Fichtean direction 
whereby the subject is understood Spinozi~ticall~ as a divine unconditioned. The 
evidence of self-certainty is only available to the individual I, which, as Schelling is 
convinced, is an instance of the absolute, and so does not come into question, anyway. 
A supra-individual, truly absolute subject, however, has a hypothetical character and 
thus needs its own justification. Schelling does not provide this but rather, as Hegel 
criticizes in the Phenomenology of Spirit (though admittedly without mentioning 
Schelling's name), "begins with absolute knowing like the shot out of a pistol" (Hegel 
Werke: 3.3 1 ). 
With regard to the status of the absolute, Schelling waivers till the end. Insofar 
as in his later philosophy he considered it discursively incomprehensible (Burbidge 
1984), Schelling approaches the "critique of reason" endorsed by his contemporary, 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) (Sandkaulen-Bock 1990: e.g. 34-7, 40-3, 
178-9). Schelling's construction of the absolute, which is supposed to underwrite the 
entire approach of the philosophy of nature, is very much up in the air with regard 
to its theoretical justification. What Schelling has provided is a wealth of ingeniously 
conceived ideas; inspiring, often even plausible, visions on which natural philo- 
sophical reflection and systematic philosophical thinking can work further. 
Schelling's reflections in O n  the Essence of Human Freedom (1809) are interesting 
with regard to the increasingly problematic relation between humans and nature. This 
work, which does not have the philosophy of nature as its object in a narrow sense, 
thematizes the self-empowerment of the human being, which accompanies his coming 
to conscious awareness and thus also his emancipation from nature. Although itself a 
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child of nature, a human being can disentangle itself from, oppose, and deform nature 
(see Wandschneider 2005a: 206-12). Schelling sees that human freedom inevitably 
brings with it the possibility of evil in the world (Schulz 197510: 333-5). One could 
take Schelling to have in mind the arrogance of technologies hostile to nature 
when he speaks of "the hunger of egoism" in which "it renounces the whole and the 
unity" (7:390) and which "denies the bonds characteristic of finite creatures, and on 
account of pride in being everything plunges into nothingness" (7:391). With that, 
the eco-ethical side of the human relation to nature is in principle already addressed 
(Schmied-Kowarzik 1985). 
The  fact that Schelling was obviously not pleased with the recourse to  an 
absolute subject is evident in, on the one hand, the admittedly ineffectual recourse 
to  an "identity" which underlies subject and object and, on the other hand, the 
incidental reference to reason as absolute instance. This is evident in the text 
System of the Entire Philosophy and of the Philosophy of Nature, In Particular (1804): 
"Reason, as reason, . . . is the absolute identity of all the effects of God, just as the 
absolute universe itself' (6:207; italicized in the original). And: "Incidentally, 
by no  means do I here understand reason as that which merely expresses itself 
in human beings but rather reason, insofar as it is universally distributed, as the 
true essence, which is the substance of everything and which inhabits the entire 
universe" (6:208) - a reprise, as it were, of the Kantian hypothesis of a supersensory 
substratum of nature. It was not until his later philosophy that Schelling tried to 
thematize the problem of reason in a fundamental way, to  solve it by means of the 
dual conception of "negative" and "positive" philosophy, and, as it were, to  think 
above and beyond reason (instructive on  this point is Schulz 1954a: 242-50; 1954b: 
344-7; 1975a: Chs 3-4; Burbidge 1984). It is precisely this which Hegel considered 
to  be impossible. For him, reason alone can be the true essence of the universe and 
simultaneously the uncircumventable foundation on  which a philosophical system 
can be established. 
Hegel 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), a colleague of Schelling's from the 
Tubingen Stift, initially considered himself a comrade of Schelling. In his first great 
philosophical publication, O n  the Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of 
Philosophy (1801), Hegel followed Schelling's philosophical project, which he opposed 
to Fichte's philosophy. However, during their subsequent years together in Jena, Hegel 
gradually developed his own position. The culmination of this development was 
the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), which led to a separation from, and ultimately a 
break with, Schelling. The philosophical approach advanced in the Phenomenology 
was developed further and presented systematically in Hegel's Encyclopedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences (1817). In what follows, I take the completed version of the 
"Encyclopedia" from 1830 as the basis for my exposition. 
After Hegel's death in 1831, and in view of the triumphant ascendancy of the 
empirical sciences and their related technologies, the fascination with Hegel's 
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philosophy subsided. It was not until eighty years later, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, that Hegel's philosophy was, as it were, rediscovered - sure enough 
with the exception of Hegel's philosophy of nature. The "Hegel renaissance" of that 
day was primarily oriented toward the humanities and thus appeared to confirm a 
common preconception according to which Hegel was not only far removed from the 
natural sciences but actually usurping them on account of "systematic constraints." 
The number of damning verdicts is legion. Even such a sympathetic interpreter 
of Hegel as Heinrich Scholz could ultimately find in Hegel's philosophy of nature 
reason to believe that "a great mind, when it errs, is not content with small errors." 
"The Hegelian philosophy of nature is an experiment, which, instead of advancing 
the philosophy of nature, set it back by hundreds of years and reduced it to the level 
it possessed during the time of Paracelsus . . .. Hegel's philosophy of nature merely 
plays with concepts and will never again be taken seriously" (Scholz 1921: 38). Ernst 
Cassirer reached a similar conclusion (111: 374-7). And in Charles Taylor's enormous 
monograph on Hegel (1983) barely 17 of the total 749 pages are devoted to the 
philosophy of nature. 
Hegel's philosophy of nature has thus fallen almost entirely out of view. Michael 
John Petry noted that "until 1970 . . . there was hardly anyone among the Hegelians, 
let alone among the philosophers of science, who was prepared to recognize Hegel's 
philosophy of nature as an area of research worth taking seriously" (Petry 1981: 618). 
This decidedly negative evaluation gradually began to change with the appearance 
of Petry's English translation of the Hegelian Philosophy of Nature in 1970, together 
with a detailed commentary which elucidated the significance of this part of Hegel's 
system for an understanding of his entire philosophy (Petry 1970). With that the ice 
was broken, and the way was cleared for an intense reception of Hegel's philosophy of 
nature (documented in Neuser 1987b; Petry 1988). After the rediscovery of Hegel's 
philosophy of spirit at the beginning of the century, his philosophy of nature was - 
with half-a-century's delay - similarly received (e.g. Buchdahl 1973). Decisive for 
this were the detailed scientific-historical investigations by Dietrich von Engelhardt 
on the intellectual context around 1800 (Engelhardt 1972, 1976), as well as the 
continuing efforts of Michael J. Petry (e.g. 1981, 1987, 199313, 2004) and many others 
after him. A further important contribution in this area was the publication of various 
discovered transcripts of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of nature (e.g. Hegel 1980, 
2000). The transcripts made possible a comparison of variants such that the meanings 
of opaque passages - of which there is in the Philosophy of Nature no shortage - could 
often be deciphered more easily. 
Thanks to such intensive efforts in research on the primary sources, the negative 
image of Hegel as a philosopher of spirit, removed from the natural sciences and 
subordinating empirical facts to the constraints of his own system, must today be 
recognized as wholly inappropriate. Hegel was continually occupied with physics, 
chemistry, geology, biology and mathematics, as is evidenced, among other things, by 
the numerous relevant works utilized by him and retained in his library (Bronger 1993; 
Mense 1993; Neuser 1987a, 2000: 199-205; Petry 1993a). Vittorio Hosle remarked 
that Hegel is "surely the last thinker who surveyed all of the sciences of his day which 
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fell outside the purview of philosophy - certainly and especially the natural sciences" 
(Hosle 198713: 279). O n  the other hand, there is without doubt in Hegel a certain 
carelessness in his engagement with the already exuberant empiricism of his day, 
whereby he succumbed not infrequently to attempts at hasty systematizations. 
Nevertheless, Hegel's philosophy of nature is, in my eyes, of paramount importance. 
His version of an objective idealism - the philosophical counterpart to Cartesianism, so 
to speak - leads to a formidable and explanatorily powerful concept of nature. In order 
to explain this, it is first necessary to sketch briefly the place of nature in the Hegelian 
system (here, see Hosle 1987b: Ch. 5; Wandschneider 1985, 198713, 1990). 
T h e  place of nature in Hegel's overall system 
In contrast to Schelling's continual reformulation of his philosophy, Hegel's philo- 
sophical conception forms a consistent, reasoned system, at least with respect to its 
construction. It is divided into Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Philosophy of Spirit. 
These parts are related essentially to one another and so constitute a systematic unity. 
Logic - understood as a fundamental logic and not as a special calculus construct -forms 
the uncircumventable foundation. Stated briefly, logic is incircumventable because 
the refutation of such a fundamental logic would itself require an appeal to logic, and 
thus appeal precisely to that whose refutation is sought. Every such attempt thus ends 
in a sublation of itself. This argument is familiar from recent discussions concerning 
"ultimate justification" and, since antiquity, has occupied a place in the repertoire of 
responses to skepticism. It is in this sense - briefly explained - that Hegel conceives 
of logic as absolute, as an ideal with absolute character, or, in Hegel's idiom, as the 
absolute idea. By this is meant the totality of the logical, which, since it encompasses 
the entirety of logic, must also include its justification and so must be conceived as self- 
justifying. Self-justification means that a cyclical structure of justification is operative 
(Rockmore 1993). Normally, a circular justification is to be avoided, on the grounds 
that circular reasoning cannot serve as an explanation. However, with regard to the 
borderline case of logic in its entirety this circle cannot be avoided. It is a necessary 
circle to which qua circle admittedly belongs not a justifying but rather an explicative 
character, in the sense that traversing this circle makes the internal structure of logic 
visible and rationally comprehensible (Wandschneider 2005b). 
In the consummation of logic in the absolute idea, says Hegel, nature is repre- 
sented as having been posited therewith, such that the idea which is consummated 
in itself "decides itself in the absolute truth of itself, . . . the immediate idea as its 
reflection, freely discharging itself out of itself as nature" (8.393). Hegel's statements on 
this point could not be more meager, It is therefore no surprise that Hegel's purported 
transition from logic to nature has been a subject of controversy from Schelling to 
the present (e.g. Volkmann-Schluck 1964; Brinkmann 1976; Falkenburg 1987: Ch. 
1, $2; Wandschneider 1990b; Drees 1993) - even more so since the transition is 
accorded a key role in Hegel's overall project. What is decisive here is the extent to 
which nature is still capable of being established on the basis of logic and, in this 
sense, idealistically. 
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Here, I would like to make do with an argument from plausibility: insofar as logic 
ultimately determines itself as absolute idea and thus, as it were, as the self-supporting, 
self-justifying system of the logically ideal in its entirety, it is thereby implied that logic 
is not determined through something which is not ideal. In other words, in the deter- 
mining of an unconditioned ideal there is simultaneously a negative referring back 
to a non-ideal. In this respect, ideal and non-ideal belong logically together. Insofar 
as the system of logic completes itself, insofar as it determines itself as absolute and 
thus as ideal, it simultaneously reveals itself as non-ideal, as non-absolute. With this 
interpretation, that obscure dictum of Hegel concerning the self-externalization of the 
absolute idea into nature acquires - in the form of a dialectic of consummation, as one 
might call it - a comprehensible meaning (Wandschneider 1985, 1990a, 1992). 
But what is the non-ideal? If the principal feature of the ideal, understood as the 
"absolute idea," is to be seen in continuous logical mediation, i.e. in a logical- 
conceptual coherence (e.g. 6.572, 8.§237, and eusats 8.69242-3), then the non-ideal 
must be characterized through a "sublation of the mediation" (6.572), i.e. through 
individuation, or as Hegel also said, being-apart <Auflereinandersein> or externality, as 
it appears empirically in the spatial-temporal structure of nature. Insofar as the logical 
realizes and consummates itself as absolute idea, it must - just as much for logical 
reasons - come out of itself and posit itself as externality, as nature. The unavoidable 
question which essentially remains open in Spinoza and Leibniz, and as seen earlier, 
also in Fichte and Schelling, is why an absolute should go out of itself, at all, and exter- 
nalize itself into the finitude of nature. Within the framework of the Hegelian system, 
this question finds an answer which is derived from the concept of the absolute itself: 
it is, as it were, the philosophical "proof . . . that nature exists necessarily," as Hegel 
himself formulated it (9.10 susats). As far as I can see, Hegel's philosophy is the only 
one which undertakes a rational justification for the existence of nature. It is therefore 
of particular interest for those interested in appropriating the available intellectual 
efforts of the past for the project of renewing the philosophy of nature. Those concrete 
consequences which arise from Hegel's concept of nature must now be considered in 
greater detail. 
Hegel's objective-idealistic concept of nature 
The logical justification which Hegel asserts is logic itself. With that - and in contrast 
to Cartesian self-certainty - Hegel utilizes not only a subjective, private authority but 
the objectively binding validity of logic. The Hegelian form of idealism is accordingly 
an objective idealism which differs fundamentally from other types of idealistic systems 
which take as their justificatory basis either self-certainty (Descartes), individual 
perception (Berkeley), the subject (Kant), the I (Fichte), or a hypothetical "absolute 
identityn (Schelling) (see also Solomon 1974; cf. Maker 1998). As seen earlier, the 
defect of these approaches consists in the fact that the underlying principle either 
is only asserted but not demonstrated; or it has ultimately a subjectively certain 
character and is thus not objectively binding: the typical deficiency of every subjective 
idealism. In contrast, only that which itself has a logical status can be capable of being 
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justified - and this is a condition which, because it takes logic as its bass, Hegel's 
objective idealism fulfills. 
As described, Hegel's concept of nature permits an answer to the question of the 
existence of nature: in the absoluteness of the logical ideal, the non-ideal, nature, 
is simultaneously posited therewith. Here, "posited therewith means that what is 
attributed to nature is not unconditioned but rather derived existence: the non-ideal 
presupposes the ideal, and, admittedly, the ideal conversely does not exist without the 
non-ideal. With Hegel, it becomes possible to develop the view according to which 
nature is understood as the, as it were, eternally attending phenomenon of the ideal. 
Leibniz designated as the fundamental problem of metaphysics the question: "Why 
is there something rather than nothing?" Hegel's reply is: to the ideal, because it is 
unconditioned, belongs necessary existence and, with that, then also to the non-ideal, 
nature, as the eternally attending phenomenon of the ideal. 
From the concept of nature characterized above there arises a fundamental 
ambivalence in the existence of nature: it is a non-ideal which however, as non-ideal, 
remains tied to the ideal. In other words, in its appearance nature is a non-ideal 
which nevertheless takes as its essential basis the ideal. What Kant in the Critique 
of Judgment tentatively assumed and then admittedly discarded, namely, the idea of 
a supersensory substratum of nature as its underlying reason, is here declared as the 
essence of nature. Hegel formulates this point as follows: nature is "the idea in the 
form of other-being" (9.24). It is certainly "in itself the idea" (9.25), i.e. its essence is 
the "inner idea which constitutes the ground of nature" (9.31); however, it appears 
as a not-ideal (Wahsner 1996: Ch. 1, $1; Neuser 2004). In nature, essence and 
appearance fall apart. 
The thought of an ideal underlying nature may at first appear outlandish. There 
is, however, good reason for this idea in view of the law-like character of nature. For 
the natural law which governs a stone is, for its part, not a stone. The law of electro- 
magnetism is not itself electromagnetic. The law-like regularity of nature is, for its 
part, not a real natural object or a natural process but rather something akin to a logic 
underlying natural being. One cannot abut against a law-like regularity, as if against 
a stone, but one can conceive of such a regularity and formulate it mathematically. 
Science aims at nothing other than the acquisition of this logic of nature (Wahsner 
and Borzeszkowski 2004; critically, Wetzel 2004: 18). To this extent, science, though 
admittedly without reflecting on  it, has fundamentally an  objective-idealistic concept 
of nature. In fact, it is this which uniquely allows one to explain how natural 
phenomena are determined by natural laws which serve as their underlying logic; how 
natural reality "is in itself law-like" (3.121-2). 
This being the case, it then becomes understandable how it is that nature is 
knowable: if thought and existence - in  roughly Descartes' sense - belonged to 
separate worlds; if nature was thus utterly foreign to thought; then nature would not 
be accessible to thought, and knowledge of nature would be impossible. If, however, 
the existence of nature in its essence is logical, then the loglcal no longer belongs 
exclusively to thought; rather, there is from the outset an affinity between thought and 
nature. Thus the question as to  how natural being can be known, i.e. can be taken 
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up into thought, contains no  aporia for such an account (critically, Onnasch 2004). 
Ultimately, the foundation for a consistent epistemology can only be an idealistic 
ontology of nature. 
Furthermore, if the ideal is characterized in terms of its conceptual coherence, then 
nature, as the non-ideal, is determined as being-apart, as externality and, with that - 
and in contrast to the logical necessity of the conceptual - through something which 
is in principle contingent (Webb 1980). Externality is the way in which the existence 
of nature appears; however, its underlying essence is the logical-ideal through which it 
remains implicitly determined. This discrepancy between appearance and essence is, 
according to Hegel, characteristic of the existence of nature. 
The tension which is thus contained in the existence of nature is said, following 
Hegel, to express itself in the tendency to overcome the discrepancy, i.e. to assimilate 
the appearance to the underlying ideal essence. Nature exhibits, as it were, a trend 
towards coherence, towards the sublation of being-apart, right up to the ideality of its 
underlying logic: as a telos which is immanent to nature and yet admittedly never 
obtainable for it. 
Here and in what follows it is important to bear in mind that Hegel certainly 
does not understand this "trend" in the sense of a real natural process but rather as 
something "categorial," i.e. as a main feature of the conceptual development, not of 
nature but rather of the categories of nature. Thus, what is meant is natural philosophical 
reasoning and not a spatial-temporal evolutionary process, the assumption of which 
Hegel repudiates (although there are good - and thoroughly Hegelian - reasons for the 
latter; see "The Philosophy of the Organic," in this section, below). 
Space and time - motion and mass 
The first determination of nature in Hegel's sense is the pure, still fully undeter- 
mined being-apart. Here, one can already see the immanent tendency of nature to 
sublate itself and to form coherent structures, i.e. the category of being-apart requires 
further categories for its implementation, which includes an increase in structure. 
Hegel's reasoning for the development of the categories of being-apart is admittedly 
barely conceivable and thus, to a considerable extent, in need of clarification. I have 
provided an interpretation of these issues elsewhere (Wandschneider 1982, 2009: Ch. 
4, $1). Here, I restrict myself to the task of making visible Hegel's intention with 
regard to this matter. 
In accordance with the law of dialectic, there belongs to the category of being-apart 
also that of the not-being-apart, the latter understood as the determinate negation of 
being-apart. This is the category of the point. The unfolding of this dialectic proceeds 
via the determinations of lines and surfaces, and ultimately to those of a spatial 
element, i.e. a space which is limited by surfaces. Hegel sees in this three-tiered 
development a consequence of logic which underlies nature, in particular the three 
L ' ~ ~ n ~ e p t ~ a l  moments" of singularity, particularity, and universality. Therein lies simul- 
taneously an argument for the three-dimensional nature of space, which would thus 
provide an a priori explanation. Philosophically, this claim is certainly inevitable. For 
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all empirical arguments for the three-dimensional nature of space ultimately amount 
to a petitio principii, insofar as an empirical natural being is always already structured 
three-dimensionally. A n  example for many is Peter Janich's idea that grinding real 
bodies shows "that only three planes can be cut pair-wise rectangularlyn (Janich 1989: 
219). Kant, on the other hand, assumes that an a priori spatial structure is given a priori 
(KVR: A25, 840-1) without accounting for this argumentatively. To this extent, 
Hegel's conceptual development - which admittedly remains to be worked out in 
detail (Halper 1998) - represents, from the standpoint of theoretical justification, a 
significant novum with respect to the philosophy of nature. 
Hegel's reasoning leads further to the category of time and its characteristic structure 
of past, present, and future: the spatial element is determined by boundaries. Now, the 
boundary itself is nothing other than the point of transition from one space to another, 
thus the ending and new beginning of space. It is without extension but is yet not 
nothing: something occurs, namely the passing from the one into the other, and that 
is only possible in the temporal ordering of succession and not in spatial juxtaposition. 
Correctly understood, the boundary is not only a spatial position but more properly 
also an event: a process having a temporal sense (discussed in detail in Wandschneider 
1982: Ch. 3). "The existence of this continuous self-sublation" is, according to Hegel, 
time (9.48 susats; Richli 2002). 
Already, this line of reasoning makes clear how relations of coherence, in the sense 
of the spatial-temporal structure of natural beings, are derivable from the assumption 
of a completely amorphous being-apart. This affects, first, the dimensional relations 
of space and time and, second, the essential togetherness of space and time (Inwood 
1987). 
Involved with the categories of space and time are, according to Hegel, the 
categories of motion, rest and - at first perhaps somewhat surprisingly - mass. Here I 
also provide only a brief summary of Hegel's reasoning (see 9.§261), or more precisely 
a reconstructive interpretation of it (Wandschneider 1982: Ch. 6; also 1987, 1990a). 
The explication of the - at first only inner - togetherness of space and time neces- 
sitates, according to Hegel, the introduction of the category of motion. Now, motion 
is only meaningful relative to something which is not in motion, i.e. the category 
of motion always implies the category of rest (on Hegel's concept of motion, see 
Wandschneider 1982: Ch. 4; Ihmig 1989: Ch. 4; on the dialectic of this concept, see 
De Laurentiis 2004). Only that can be at rest whose identity is preserved in motion 
and which defines through this a determinate, single place as the instance of reference 
of the motion. According to Hegel, such a singular thing whose identity is preserved in 
motion is mass (9.§261). However, insofar as mass is singular, there can be in principle 
many instances of mass (Wandschneider 1982: 210; FCvrier 2000: 156), which are 
distinct from one another and yet as individuals are also similar. This tension, which 
is contained intrinsically in matter, is said to express itself as gravitational force, i.e. as 
the striving of instances of mass to each other; that is, as the tendency to sublate their 
heterogeneity (9.5262; Winfield 1998). 
The category of mass is thus implied through the "logic" of the concept of motion: 
that is, as an identity-preserving individual through which first and foremost "place" 
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is realized, in the sense of an instance of reference which is necessary for motion and 
which as such represents non-motion, or "rest." One mass can itself naturally also be 
moved relative to another mass. In this case, the relation of motion is symmetrical: 
each of the two masses can equally be considered as either at rest or in motion (Hegel 
JEN: 258-9, 361). In fact, Hegel thereby formulates a principle of relativity of motion, 
which in this form implies: motion of mass is equivalent with relative motion. 
Relatiwe motion and the absoluteness of the motion of light 
This relationship has - independently of Hegel - the notable consequence that the 
movement of a non-mass is a non-relative movement: qua movement it is certainly 
related to a mass, but qua non-relative it is independent of the particular instance of 
reference and so is related to every mass in the same way. In other words: a non-relative 
motion has the same velocity in relation to all masses. Moreover, such a non-mass - 
in accordance with its concept - cannot be in a state of rest but rather can only be in 
motion - a very peculiar phenomenon which in point of fact has been realized empiri- 
cally in the form of the motion of light. 
But how should one understand the concept of a non-mass? Hegel asserted that 
in nature there must be something which is identified with light and to which is 
attributed the absolute (and thus non-relative) character of the movement of light 
(9.111-12 gusatg). As mentioned, empirically, this applies to light, a fact which led 
Einstein to the development of the ("special") theory of relativity. Naturally, it would 
be absurd to say that Hegel had anticipated Einstein's theory, for the latter is above all 
a complex mathematical theory whose real value consists in its demonstration of the 
compatibility of relative and non-relative motion. Nevertheless, following Hegel, the 
elementary idea is in point of fact derivable from the "logic of the concept of motion." 
In this regard, John N. Findlay was not wrong when he  claimed there is "a flavour of 
relativity-physics in some of the things Hegel says about Light" (Findlay 1964: 279). 
In point of fact, the interpretation of Hegel developed here admits the possibility of a 
natural philosophical explanation of the relation between relative and absolute motion: 
the relativity of bodily motion and the non-relativity of non-bodily motion are accordingly 
expressions of two strictly opposed forms of matter - body and light - which, according to 
Hegel, are derivable from the "logic" of the concepts of motion and matter. The philo- 
sophical interpretation of the principle of relativity offered here yields a necessary 
and non-trivial consequence: namely, that not only does a non-relative motion not 
contradict the principle of the relativity of motion, it is actually implicated in that 
principle. This may be conceived as a fundamental natural philosophical insight 
(discussed in detail in Wandschneider 2009: Ch. 4, $9). 
Here, striking possibilities for the updating of an Hegelian natural philosophical line 
of reasoning become visible in the sense of a philosophy of modern physics: the thought 
developed here should be understood as a contribution to the philosophical explo- 
ration of the theory of relativity, the likes of which was not achieved in the exceedingly 
sophisticated investigations of Ernst Cassirer (1972) and Hans Reichenbach (1924, 
9 1 
GERMAN IDEALISM 
Light already belongs under the second heading in the Hegelian Philosophy of 
Nature. The first part, entitled "Mechanics," takes as its object the material existence 
of nature and does so without further qualification. The second part, which Hegel 
designates as "Physics," thematizes the different qualitative determinations of matter 
and begins with light (9.§275; Falkenburg 1993) - whereby Hegel's interpretation is 
manifestly tied to the thoughts of the early Schelling (see Schelling Werke: 4:162-6, 
169, 174; vol. 7, 358). Additional consideration is given also to other physical issues, 
such as the (classical) elements of cohesion, caloric, electricity, magnetism, and 
chemical phenomena (on Hegel's account of chemistry, see Engelhardt 1976, 198413, 
1993; Burbidge 1993, 1996, 2001). The assertions of thls chapter - being to a certain 
extent empirically oriented and thus related to the state of the just emerging natural 
science of that time - are often reflective of an earlier period and consequently have 
been surpassed to a considerable extent. Polemics against Hegel's Philosophy of Nature 
were drawn significantly from this second part. For the philosophy of nature, however, 
the fundamental idea underlying this chapter is still of significance: namely, that 
the qualitative material determinations - e.g. from acid and base in chemistry - are 
mutually related to one another and in their qualitative existence consist only in this 
intrinsic relationality (9.§112, $274 zusatz). 
Philosophy of the organic 
Deserving of particular interest is the third part of the Hegelian Naturphilosophie, the 
subject of which is the philosophy of the organic (Ilting 1987; Brinkmann 1996; Neuser 
2000b; Frigo 2001; Bach 2004; Breidbach 2004). What is characteristic of organisms, 
according to Hegel, is that they possess subject character <Subjektcharakter> (9.337, 
339-42 zusatz), and for Hegel that means: the structure of a concept (339 zusatz). The 
earthworm is, so to speak, a concept which works its way through the soil! Decisive 
for this view is the fact that the organism shows itself to be self-preserving in the sense 
that it automatically seeks to preserve itself in its specific nature, i.e. in the unwer- 
sality of its species. The life process of a fly is at the same time a continuous striving 
towards the preservation of the "fly-like characteristics" which it realizes, simply 
because the organism, according to Hegel, is intrinsically a universal which strives 
to preserve its identity in its specifications - and this, for Hegel, IS clear evidence of 
a teleologically structured nature (Dahlstrom 1998). Therewith, the fly is in point of 
fact something like a concept which has become acting, hence a subject. The concept, 
which according to the objective-idealistic view underlies the entirety of nature, itself 
appears in the organism in, as it were, a physical form: "What heretofore was only 
our cognition has now entered into existence'' (340 qusatz). "Here, nature has thus 
achieved the existence of a concept" (336 zusatz); "life is the concept which has come 
to its manifestation" (37 zusatz). 
Here, one must ask to what extent this "speculative" view admits of empirical 
conditions of realization. Today, a categorical answer is possible within the framework 
of systems theory. According to W. Ross Ashby, one of the early protagonists of cyber- 
netics, an organism can only be a self-preserving system insofar as it, howsoever, 
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contains a control agent which controls and regulates the system's functioning in 
terms of self-preservation. It is, as it were, a representation of itself, a self-agent- 
instance. Accordingly, organic self-preservation should in principle be understood in 
the sense that the self-regulation of the system is steered by the set points of the system 
existence itself, and thus by the constitutive physiological parameters of the system: 
such a system strives to preserve its own existence (Ashby 1966: esp. Chs 7 and 9). In 
this way, Hegel's account of the organism as an existing concept can be reconstrued in 
terms of systems theory. 
With regard to the claimed tendency towards coherence and idealization which 
Hegel attributes to nature, the organism is evidently the most advanced. Now, can 
this be understood as the result of an evolution of nature? According to Hegel, nature 
in general is "to be considered as a system of levels, wherein one necessarily proceeds 
out of another." However, one should "not think that these levels would be generated 
naturally" (9.31). Hegel rejects the idea of a real evolution of forms of nature (Breidbach 
1987; Drees 1992) about which there is for us today no  doubt. The reason for Hegel's 
verdict is the earlier discussed "categorial" view of development which attributes 
development to the "concept," alone (8.308-9 wsats). Elsewhere I have shown that 
precisely within the framework of the Hegelian ontology of nature one can also argue 
for a temporally real layering process <Aufstufungsprozess> of nature, without requiring 
for that argument Hegel's concept of development (in the sense of a conceptual devel- 
opment) (Wandschneider 2001 ). 
Higher levels mean an increase in complexity and thus, in principle, require more 
complex organisms. Plants, for example, are autoaophic, i.e. they are in the position to 
produce organic substance itself out of the materials dissolved in the ground at their 
locations by converting these into system-like organismic substances. By contrast, 
animals are heterotrophic, i.e. they require organic substance which is produced by 
other living organisms, e.g. plants. This at first seemingly inessential fact nevertheless 
has decisive consequences for the organization of animals, a point to which Hegel 
also alluded (9.430-1): not only must an animal be equipped with an appropriate set 
of teeth and digestive system for the intake and processing of nourishment; it must 
above all and from the outset be able to find such nourishment. To this end, the 
animal must be able to move about and orient itself in its environment. And this 
requires an organization of the senses, a nervous system and - in principle - a central 
agent for guiding and controlling, a brain; both for the processing of sense data, as 
well as for coordinating and monitoring vital external action. This is in contrast to 
the plant whose internal functions are merely a matter of biochemical regulation. The 
organization of an animal is necessarily more complex than that of plants. Thus in the 
course of biological evolution something new continuously arises - how should that be 
understood with respect to the ontology of nature? 
Let us first consider the question of novelty from an empirical-scientific standpoint. 
Modem systems theory invokes the concept of emergence. This explains the occurrence 
of qualitatively new characteristics on the basis of the formation of the system, i.e. as a 
holistic phenomenon. Emergent qualities are qualities of the system which relate to it in 
its entirety and for that reason can be completely novel with respect to the qualities 
GERMAN IDEALISM
of the subsystems. At the same time, that which arises through emergence is always
already contained within the existence of nature as a possibility. This is latent in the
elementary matter, but it is in the system’s formation that the possibilities which lie
within the system become manifest. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that
matter underlies the laws of nature. System formation is nothing other than an inter-
connection of elementary natural laws into a more complex form of lawfulness, even
system laws which can thus lead to the emergence of qualitatively new phenomena.
In other words, the existence of nature is not limited to its primitive phenotype but
rather contains intrinsically possibility which, for its part, stems from the natural laws
and becomes apparent in emerging phenomena. So this dimension of possibility which
is tied to the natural being is of decisive significance for an understanding of system
formation, evolution, and, of course, technology. Their basis is to be recognized in laws
of nature.
Here, one can again see the fruitfulness of the Hegelian concept of nature.
According to the objective-idealistic explanation, the laws of nature are an expression
of the logic underlying nature. This being the case, the central assumption of every
theory of evolution can now be substantiated, in that nature does not run out in its
actual state but rather contains possibility which increasingly becomes manifest, or
“emerges,” in the process of evolution. A persuasive ontological foundation for the
theory of evolution is only possible within the framework of an objective-idealistic
ontology of nature, even when, as mentioned earlier, Hegel himself denies the
possibility of a real evolutionary process. Despite this untimely repudiation of evolu-
tionary thought, Hegel’s approach has an eminent explanatory value with respect to
an ontology of nature concerning evolution. lt is in this sense that Findlay explains, “If
any philosopher is a philosopher of evolution, that philosopher is Hegel . .. Had the
Darwinian and later data been available, he would almost certainly have acknowl-
edged the historical trends in nature that he admits in the realm of spirit” (1964: Z72;
similarly, see Harris 1998: Z06).
Emergence of the psychic from nature
However great the fiill range of possibility inherent in nature might be, it ultimately
reveals itself in the emergence of the psychic. To clarify this, I will first pursue the line
of argument from the system-theoretical interpretation l have developed and then show
that, from that vantage point, Hegel’s explanation of feeling can be reconstructed.
This is related both to what was presented earlier, as well as to some of my other work
(Wandschneider 1987b, 1999, ZOO9: Ch. 7). l first briefly present again that line of
argument.
As explained earlier, organisms have a subject-character in the sense of an actively
self-preserving universal in the life process. Considered system-theoretically, this
means, as already indicated, that there is a kind of agent which controls and regulates
the self-preservation of the organism. In terms of the traditional concept, there is a
self-instance, or a self. This is structured differently in the case of plants and animals.
For the autotrophic plant, it is a matter of the self-regulation of biochemical functions,
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and it is in this sense that I will speak of a function-self. Over and above that, the
heterotrophic animal has ~ on the basis of the earlier mentioned organization of
nerves and senses — the capacity to control and coordinate actions and, correspond-
ingly, possesses not only a function-self but also an action-self, as I will call it. Thus,
from a system-theoretical perspective, what is characteristic of the animal subject is a
double structure of the function-self and the action-self.
Now, such a “doubled self” is also asserted by Hegel: in contrast to plants, it is
characteristic of animals that they possess a “doubling of subjectivity” in their “unity”
(9.430 zusatz), quasi a “self—self” (432 zusatz), i.e. a “self which is for the self” (430
zusatz, also 432 zusatz, 465 zusatz). In other words, the self has “itself as an object”
(432 zusatz). This “finding itself in itself” of the subject is, according to Hegel, “feeling”
(342 zusatz, my italics; see also 432 zusatz ).
Hegel does not explain in greater detail the subjective double-structure which
underlies feeling. This concept is, however, immediately evident in the system-
theoretical reconstruction provided above. Similarly, the structure of feeling is
comprehensible in system-theoretical terms: what is obviously essential for the
characteristic duality of the function-self and action~self is that both cooperate for
the organism’s self-preservation. The function-self represents the physiological
needs of the organism which then prescribes a norm to the steering activity of
the action-self. This is especially the case for the action-self’s perception which
is always two-sidedly oriented. On the one hand, it is external perception, on
the other hand it is also internal perception, i.e. perception of the physiological
situation of the organism. For example, the perception of temperature contains at
the same time information about the extent to which the perceived temperature
is conducive for the organism itself; or insofar as I have a tactile impression of an
object, I at once have a tactile impression of myself (see 9.466 zusatz). Thus, in
principle, animal perception includes - namely, increasingly with the stage of
development — a subjective element. In the perception of what is external, the
perception of what is internal is, as it were, superimposed. The subjective affec-
tivity is thus not merely an organic state but rather also appears additionally in
perception. This subjectii/ized perception is, in Hegel’s formulation, the subject’s
finding-itself-in-itself, or feeling.
In this elementary form of the psychic in nature, I think one can see a concrete
starting-point for a further clarification of the body—soul-problem. To some extent,
contemporary discussion of the “mind—body relation” begins at too “high” a level.
In the abstract opposing of body and mind, the contrast is so crass that it scarcely
seems surmountable (for an interpretation of the psychic within the framework of the
Hegelian philosophy of mind, see Wolff 1992).
Similarly, those characteristics of the psychic to which Hegel refers, such as
non-localness (9.431 zusatz), inwardness (9.377 zusatz, also lO.2O zusatz) and self-
identity (9.430 zusatz, lO.97 zusatz), find within the framework of the developed
system-theoretical model an explanation. Insofar as the psychic is constituted in the
fusion of external and intemal perception, as was shown earlier, it is not localizable in
some particular place in the body. Rather, the psychic is present equally in all feelings.
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Moreover, this means that in the occurrence of feelings a subjective, inner horizon
extends itself at once in perception; it is a private sphere of “inwardness” which is
only accessible to the subject itself. Finally, it is in this inwardness that the subject is
continuously with itself in the diversity of feelings. Not only does the subject preserve
its identity amid the continually changing feelings, but it has moreover a perception of
this identity and thus an identity for itself, or a self-identity.
I think it is in this manner that a system-theoretical reconstruction of Hegel’s
account of feeling is possible and thus also an empirical-scientific concretizing
of Hegel’s approach (presented in detail in Wandschneider 1999, 2009: Ch. 7).
It is as an emergent phenomenon that the psychic becomes explicable, and the
tendency for idealizing nature emphasized by Hegel likewise manifests itself with
the utmost clarity: in the non-localness, the inwardness, the self-identity, and
therewith also the ideality of psychic existence it becomes apparent that the
existence of nature realizes itself not in dull materiality but rather always already
contains the possibility of ideality (9.465 zusatz). “The progress of nature itself
consists in bringing to light what is internal; to go into itself and to become
subjective, and to do this by overcoming its externality and positing it as ideal”
(Hegel 1980: 11).
With the appearance of subjectivity, perception and feeling, a natural evolutionary
tendency toward cognition and self-perception becomes visible. Ultimately, this
culminates in the appearance of spirit and, with that, culture (Burbidge 1996: 210-11;
Wandschneider 2005a: 206-12; on the organic and psychic dimension of illness in
Hegel’s account, see Engelhardt 1984c). Hegel’s philosophy of nature also ends with the
transition to spirit: “[With that], nature’s last externality is sublated, and the Concept
which in nature is only in itself thus becomes for itself’ (9.537), i.e. the Concept recog-
nizes itself in nature.
Also, from an evolutionary perspective, nature has developed in the form of spirit
a kind of organ, as it were, which now can turn back on nature and recognize it:
in this manner, so to speak, “nature is realized in spirit” (Breidbach 2004: 226). In
the knowledge of nature, spirit adds something to it which is not realized within its
own horizon, namely the knowledge of its own underlying ideality. Hegel’s dictum —
“Nature presupposes spirit; spirit is nature’s end. The result of the philosophy of nature
is: reconciliation of spirit with nature, by knowing in nature the idea which spirit
itself is in the form of self-consciousness” (Hegel 1980: 145) — this dictum can also be
interpreted evolutionary-theoretically: the ideal essence of nature sets in motion an
evolutionary process which ultimately manifests this ideal. It is by means of evolution
that the ideal, as it were, carries out its own self-revelation. This, ultimately, must be
the answer to the question of the direction and goal of evolution — spirit, as “the goal
to which nature itself aims” (Quante 2002: 119).
The relevance of the Hegelian philosophy of nature
In the reconstructive interpretation offered here, I-Iegel’s philosophy of nature provides
an impressive comprehensive view of nature (Schmied-Kowarzik 1998; Fulda 2006):
96
THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE
a continuous relation of natural phenomena in the form of a sequence of levels which
exhibits a tendency towards increasing coherence and ideality — from elementary
being-apart to the quasi-ideality of the psychic. Accordingly, the existence of nature
is not taken up with the facticity of the material but rather contains essentially possi-
bility, and in particular the possibility of the psychic, which thus no longer appears as
some remote realm cut off from the physical.
Such a unified view of nature is contained in materialism, or, from a scientific
perspective, physicalism. Certainly, here a fundamental difference becomes clear: these
positions are of limited import for the philosophy of nature because they are not
equipped with a sufficient ontology of nature; they are not in a position to explain
the law-like character of nature which they nevertheless presuppose. It is only within
the framework of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature — for which there are good
reasons, as shown earlier — that this can be achieved.
On the other side, this line of reasoning must also be supplemented by arguments
conceming the conditions for the realization of natural phenomena. Insofar as these
belong to the real world, considerations of realizibility cannot be ignored, and in
this sense the integration of empirical-scientific arguments becomes unavoidable. The
system-theoretical connections raised here are an example of this. Hegel explains
feeling in terms of the self—self-structure of animal subjectivity, admittedly without
providing a justification for this peculiar double structure. At the same time, he
also points to empirical conditions for the kind of existence which animals exhibit
(self-motion, interrupted intake of food, nervous systems, etc., see 9430-1). The
system-theoretical considerations developed here assimilate essentially this line of
argument and simply pursue its consequences.
In point of fact, it is also of philosophical interest to clarify whether, to what extent,
and in what way the “self—self-structure” is really possible, and what consequences follow
from that. Among these consequences is the ability to reconstruct feeling in terms
of systems theory. In this regard, one can say that Hegel’s line of reasoning not only
allows for an actualization, in the sense of empirical conditions of realization, but also
requires such an actualization, that the natural philosophical argumentation not only
can accommodate empirical-scientific considerations but moreover must do so.
Conversely, the emergence of the psychic can be explained only within the
framework of an ontology of nature of the Hegelian type, whereby the ideal is the
essence which underlies physical existence and which can manifest itself through
emergence. It is by means of this that the empirical system-theoretical line of
argument first gains an ontological foundation.
In essence, Hegel’s philosophy of nature proves itself to be of amazing contem-
porary relevance — even despite some mistakes and misinterpretations reflective of
its historical period. It aims at an integrated view of nature via its conception of an
intrinsic unity of nature, which offers a persuasive alternative to both Cartesian reduc-
tionism and Kantian dualism. In my view, it is in Hegel’s philosophy of nature that
we have the most sophisticated concept of nature in philosophy (similarly, Rinaldi
2002: 248). Now it is our turn to utilize this enormous philosophical labor, sedimented
in Hegel’s project. On the one hand, it is as an empirical-scientific concretization of
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Hegelian arguments with respect to the conditions for the realization of that which
constrains the integration ofempirical-scientific issues. On the other hand, conversely,
it provides an ontological foundation for empirical-scientific lines of argument on the
basis of an objective-idealistic ontology of nature. In this reciprocal interweaving
and illumination of natural scientific and idealistic approaches, the opportunity
for a contemporary concept of nature and, with that, a renewal of an autonomous
philosophy of nature, becomes visible.
Note
1 Angle brackets (< >) distinguish the translators interpolations.
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